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Abstract
In this paper we aim to provide insight into the complexity of outbreak management in an intensive care unit (ICU) setting. In October 2010 four
patients on the ICU of our tertiary care centrewere colonized or infectedwith a multidrug-resistant strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa (MDR-PA).
An outbreak investigation was carried out and infection control measures were taken in an attempt to identify a potential source and stop
transmission. The outbreak investigation included descriptive epidemiology, comprising retrospective case ﬁnding by reviewing the laboratory
information system back to 2004 and prospective case ﬁnding by patient screening for MDR-PA. Furthermore, microbiological analysis,
environmental screening and a case-control studywere carried out. Infection controlmeasures consisted of re-education of healthcare personnel
on basic hygiene measures, auditing of hygiene procedures used in daily practice by infection control practitioners, and stepwise up-regulation of
isolation measures. From February 2009 to January 2012, 44 patients on our ICUwere found to beMDR-PA positive. MDR-PA isolates of the 44
patients showed twodistinctAFLPpatterns,withhomologywithin eachof theAFLP clusters ofmore than93%. TheVIMmetallo-b-lactamase gene
was detected in 20 of 21 tested isolates. A descriptive epidemiology investigation identiﬁed the rooms with the highest numbers of MDR-PA
positive patients. The case-control study showed three factors to be independently associatedwithMDR-PApositivity: admission to ICUsubunit 1
(OR, 6.1; 95%CI, 1.7, 22), surgery prior toor during admission (OR, 5.7; 95%CI, 1.6, 20) and beingwarmed-upwith thewarm-air blanket (OR, 3.6;
95% CI, 1.2, 11). After three environmental screening rounds, with sampling of sinks, furniture and devices in the ICU, without revealing a clear
common source, a fourth environmental investigation included culturing of faucet aerators. Two faucets were found to be positive for MDR-PA
and were replaced. The occurrence of new cases decreased with the strengthening of infection control measures and declined further with the
removal of the common source. With this integrated approach a prolonged outbreak of P. aeruginosa was controlled. Contaminated faucet
aerators on the ICU probably served as a persisting source, while interpatient transmission by medical staff was a likely way of spread. Seven
months after the last case (January 2012) and 3 months after cessation of extended isolationmeasures (May 2012), single cases started tooccur on
the ICU, with a total of seven patients in the past year. No common source has yet been found.
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Introduction
In October 2010, a multidrug-resistant strain of Pseudomonas
aeruginosa (MDR-PA) was isolated from four patients on the
ICU of the Leiden University Medical Centre (LUMC).
Hospital outbreaks of P. aeruginosa have been described in
intensive care units (ICUs) [1] and neonatal care units [2,3]
and on wards [4]. Increasingly, multidrug-resistant strains are
involved [1,5,6]. An outbreak can be limited rather quickly
when a common source can be identiﬁed, such as soap
dispensers [4], mineral water bottles [2,7], faucets [8,9] or
contaminated mouth swabs [10]. However, it can be pro-
longed when no single common source can be identiﬁed and
removed. In this paper we describe our efforts to control a
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prolonged outbreak on our ICU. We aim to provide insight
into the complexity of outbreak management in this speciﬁc
type of outbreak, which may be encountered in ICU settings
around the globe, and demonstrate the need for combined,
integrated measures over time [11].
Methods
Setting
The LUMC is a tertiary care and teaching hospital in the
Netherlands with 30 IC beds for adult patients on four
subunits (Fig. 1). In ICUs 1 and 2 the majority of admissions
are surgical patients, while internal medicine and neurology
patients are often placed in ICUs 3 and 4.
Outbreak investigation
Descriptive epidemiology. In October 2010 a clinical microbiol-
ogist found a cluster of four patients on the ICU with
MDR-PA. Retrospective and prospective case ﬁnding was
initiated. Cases were deﬁned as patients who had been
admitted to the LUMC from 2004 onwards and had a clinical
or surveillance sample positive for P. aeruginosa (intermedi-
ately) resistant to meropenem, resistant to tobramycin and
with a particular AFLP genotype (see below). Retrospective
case ﬁnding was performed by reviewing the laboratory
information system back to 2004. Prospective case ﬁnding
initially consisted of semi-weekly culturing of sputum and
rectal swabs of patients who were enrolled in a Selective
Digestive tract Decontamination study [12], which required a
minimum stay on the ICU of 3 days. To enhance case-ﬁnding, a
cross-sectional culture round of all patients on the ICU took
place in November 2010. Regular patient screening rounds
were introduced in December 2011: all patients on ICUs 1 and
2 were sampled weekly by taking swabs from the throat and
rectum. In addition, when a new case was identiﬁed, his/her
contacts (roommates) were screened.
A date and transmission map was created, showing on a
time-line the period of hospital admission for each patient,
moment of ﬁrst positive culture and location of stay (ward,
room and bed). In addition, an epidemic curve was created.
Microbiology and molecular diagnostics. Initially, surveillance
cultures were taken according to the protocol of an unrelated
Selective Digestive tract Decontamination study [12] and were
inoculated on a blood agar plate, chocolate agar plate and
Cysteine Lactose Electrolyte Deﬁcient agar (CLED) plate in
order to isolate aerobic Gram-negative bacteria. A more
sensitive and speciﬁc method was already used for environ-
mental sampling and introduced for patient screening in
December 2011: specimens were cultured for 15–18 h at
35°C in tryptic soy broth, with cefotaxim (0.25 mg/L) and
vancomycin (8 mg/L) (bioMerieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France). The
broth was subcultured on MacConkey agar with tobramycin
(8 mg/L) (bioMerieux). Water samples were ﬁltered using the
Milliﬂex Filtrate System (MilliﬂexPlus Vacuum Pump, Merck
KGaA, Darmstadt, Germany) and inoculated on Tryptone
Glucose Extrate Agar (TGEA) (Millipore, Merck KGaA).
Bacterial identiﬁcation was obtained by MALDI-TOF (Bru-
ker Daltonics, Bremen, Germany). Susceptibility patterns were
acquired with VITEK 2 (bioMerieux). Etest conﬁrmation
(bioMerieux) of the VITEK results was carried out for
meropenem and ceftazidime. European Committee on Anti-
microbial Susceptibility Testing clinical breakpoints were used
to interpret susceptibility outcomes.
The ﬁrst 21 isolates were tested for the presence of blaVIM
and blaIMP genes by polymerase chain reaction ampliﬁcation
using speciﬁc primers for blaVIM (forward: GGTGARTA
TCCGACAGT, reverse: GCCCGGYAGRCCGTG) and
blaIMP (forward: GGAATAGRRTGGCTTAAYTCTC, reverse:
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4
103Room 105 110
798089
117114113
74
41
20 22
444649
3532
39
Room
Bed
Bed
10 9 8 7 6
11 12 13
5 4 3 2 1
14 15 16 282930
20191817
252627
242221 23
FIG. 1. Map of the Intensive Care Unit. Until December 2010, Intensive Care Units (ICUs) 1 and 2 were on a different ﬂoor level to ICUs 3 and 4.
From December 2010 onwards, ICUs 3 and 4 were moved to be situated next to units 1 and 2.
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CAAACYACTASGTTATCTKGAG), resulting in 642 bp and
187 bp fragments respectively. All isolates were comparatively
typed by the use of AFLP (protocol available upon request) [13].
Environmental investigation. Four rounds of environmental
investigation were performed by taking swabs and water
samples. The ﬁrst round in February 2011 focused on sink
drains. In June 2011, a second round of sampling included 125
environmental cultures of furniture and devices on the ICU
(e.g. stethoscopes, beds, bedside cabinets, soap dispensers,
monitors, keyboards, counters, ultrasound machines, shaving
machines and an inﬂatable hair-washing basin). All sinks on the
ICU were sampled in August 2011. The fourth round of
cultures, in November 2011, was directed by the outcomes of
the case-control study (see Results section).
Case-control study. A case-control study was conducted
between August and October 2011. Patients were included
as cases if they acquired the outbreak strain on the ICU
between January 1 2010 and August 21 2011. Exclusion criteria
were: a positive culture within 48 h of ICU admission or a
positive culture more than 4 weeks after ICU discharge. For
each case two control patients were selected from the ICU,
who matched best on length of stay and date of admission. A
control patient was deﬁned as a patient on the ICU who tested
at least three times negative for the outbreak strain during the
follow-up period. The follow-up period was deﬁned from the
day of ICU admission to the day of positive culture. For
controls the end of follow-up was determined by the date of
the latest available culture that resulted in a comparable
follow-up time with the matching case.
Patient data (see Table 2) were extracted from different
hospital electronic information systems: MediScore (Itemedical,
Tiel, the Netherlands), MetaVision Suite (iMDsoft, Needham,
MA, USA) and EZIS (Chipsoft, Amsterdam, the Netherlands).
For statistical analyses, PASW Statistics 17.0 (SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL, USA) and STATA 10.1 (StataCorp, College
Station, Texas, USA) were used. Conditional logistic regres-
sion was applied for matched analyses, with a level of
signiﬁcance (a) of 0.05. Covariates for multivariate regression
analysis were selected based on plausibility and p-value of <0.1
in univariate regression analysis. Results are reported in odds
ratios (ORs) with 95% conﬁdence intervals (95% CI).
Results
Outbreak investigation
Descriptive epidemiology. In addition to the four index cases in
October 2010, 42 outbreak cases were identiﬁed, including 13
cases from 2009 until October 2010 and 29 cases prospec-
tively identiﬁed from October 2010 to January 2012 (Fig. 2); 44
had stayed on the ICU.
The date and transmission map (not shown) showed that
from September 2010 to the last case in 2012, there was
constant overlap of ICU-stay between case patients, with a
1-week break. Secondly, it showed that case patients clustered
on ICUs 1 and 2. Only nine patients contracted the outbreak
strain after admission to ICU 3 or 4. Furthermore, two rooms
on ICUs 1 and 2 were most frequently involved: room 89
(beds 11 and 12; n = 11) and room 113 (bed 5; n = 6). Of the
last 14 case patients that were identiﬁed, 10 had stayed in
either of those rooms.
Microbiology and molecular diagnostics. The outbreak strain
P. aeruginosa was resistant to gentamicin in all but two cases
(clinical breakpoint: MIC 4 mg/L). All isolates were resistant to
tobramycin (MIC >4 mg/L). Ceftazidime susceptibility varied:
41 isolates had a MIC >8 mg/L (resistant), four had a MIC of
8 mg/L (intermediate) and one had a MIC of <8 mg/L
(susceptible). Of the 46 isolates, four were resistant to
meropenem (MIC >8 mg/L), 41 had a MIC >2 and ≤8
(intermediate) and one was found susceptible (MIC ≤2 mg/
L). Thirty-four isolates were susceptible to ciproﬂoxacin (MIC
≤0.5 mg/L) and 12 were resistant (MIC >1). Colistin was the
only antibiotic to which all isolates were susceptible (MIC
≤4 mg/L).
The VIM-metallo-b-lactamase gene was detected in all but
one of the 21 isolates tested. No IMP-metallo-b-lactamase
gene was detected. AFLP showed that the 46 isolates
described in this outbreak were divided into two AFLP
patterns, with over 93% homology within each cluster
(Fig. 3). With respect to susceptibility patterns, the two
clusters differed in ciproﬂoxacin susceptibility: Cluster 1
strains were ciproﬂoxacin resistant whereas Cluster 2 strains
were ciproﬂoxacin susceptible. One case patient carried both
strains.
The time of acquisition from ICU-admission varied from
1 to 128 days. The ﬁrst body site found to be colonized
or infected was the respiratory tract (sputum or throat
swab) in 22 of 46 cases, the rectum in 12, blood in
four cases, and the bladder (urine) in three. A wound,
abdominal drain ﬂuid and central venous catheter tip were
the sites of a ﬁrst culture positive for an outbreak strain in
four cases.
Environmental investigation. The results of environmental
screening are depicted in Table 1. Sink drains were found
to be intermittently positive for the outbreak strain on all
ICU subunits: in patient rooms, utility rooms and toilet
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facilities for employees. Chlorination of sink drains three
times a week from February 2011 until August 2011 was
ineffective. Of the 125 environmental samples taken in June
2011, six were found to be positive for MDR-PA (Table 1).
In November 2011, cultures were taken from objects that
were suggested to be associated with acquisition of the
outbreak strain by the case-control study (p < 0.1). These
included six warm-air machines, two ventilation machines
and one CVVH machine on the ICU and all 19 cooling
mattresses in the operation rooms; all were negative for
the outbreak strain. Additionally, as both descriptive epide-
miology and the case-control study (see below) pointed
to ICU 1 and room 89, a local source was hypothesized
and all 16 faucet aerators in the patient rooms of ICUs 1 and
2 were cultured. Two were found to be positive for a strain
from Cluster 2: bed 11 (room 89/ICU 1) and bed 5
(room 113/ICU 2). Water samples from the outlets of the
supplying mains were negative. These contaminated faucets
and all faucet aerators on ICUs 1–4 were replaced in
FIG. 2. Epidemic curve of the outbreak with timing of infection control measures. Showing the number of new cases in time and timing of
implementation of infection control measures. Dark bars reﬂect the patients with a Cluster 1 strain, light bars represent those with a Cluster 2 strain.
One patient was colonized with strains from both clusters (striped bar).
TABLE 1. Environmental objects from which outbreak
strains were isolated
Screening
lound Objects, n cultures Positive object
AFLP
cluster
February 2011 Sink drains Sink drains (all units) 1 and 2
June 2011 Furniture and
devices, n = 125
Sink, bed 5/ICU2 2
Sink, bed 11/ICU1 2
Sink, bed 12/ICU1 1
Bedside cabinet, bed 6/ICU1 2
Hair washing basin 1
August 2011 Sink drains: ICU 1
and 2, n = 25
n= 8; n=2 typed by AFLP: 2
ICU 3 and 4,
n = 16
n= 5 NT
November
2011
Suspect devices
case-control
study, n = 40
No positive cultures
Faucet aerators,
n = 16
Faucet, bed 5 NT
Faucet, bed 11 NT
Faucet and water
samples, n = 24
Faucet aerator,
beds 5 and 11
Both 2
Sink drain, beds
5 and 11
NT
Water through
aerator, beds 5 and 11
NT, 2
Water not through
aerator, 11
2
Sink, bed 11 NT
Sink counter, bed 11 NT
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TABLE 2. Results of the case-control study
Cases,
n = 32
Controls,
n = 64 OR (95% CI) p-value
Patient characteristics
Age, mean years (range) 63 (15–83) 58 (18–85)
Male sex, frequency (%) 23 (72) 40 (63)
Height, mean cm (range) 174 (140–191) 175 (150–196)
Weight, mean kg (range) 82 (44–130) 79 (48–120)
Follow-up time, mean days (range)1 26.3 (2–79) 26.6 (3–84)
APACHE II score at admission, mean (range) 21 (5–41) 22 (6–37)
APACHE IV score at admission, mean (range) 75 (11–157) 79 (18–151)
Admission data
Referring department categorized, frequency (%)
Internal medicine 3 (9) 14 (22) 1
Surgery 9 (28) 13 (20) 5.9 (0.9;40) 0.064
Thoracic surgery 10 (31) 10 (16) 7.1 (1.2;44) 0.034
Other 10 (31) 27 (42) 2.4 (0.4;13) 0.307
Reason for admission, frequency (%)
Medical 9 (28) 38 (59) 1
Planned surgery 11 (34) 14 (22) 4.0 (1.2;13) 0.022
Acute surgery 12 (38) 12 (19) 4.4 (1.4;14) 0.010
IC Unit, frequency (%)
IC subunit 1 17 (53) 16 (25) 4.0 (1.4;11) 0.009
IC subunit 2 10 (31) 16 (25)
IC subunit 3 2 (6) 11 (17)
IC subunit 4 1 (3) 6 (9)
IC subunits 3 and 4 before December 20103 5 (16) 17 (27)
Room number (selection2), frequency (%)
89 (subunit 1) 8 (25) 7 (11) 2.7 (0.9;8.4) 0.089
103 (subunit 1) 4 (13) 4 (6)
105 (subunit 1) 6 (19) 7 (11)
110 (subunit 1) 5 (16) 4 (6)
Bed number (selection2), frequency (%)
6 (room 110) 5 (16) 4 (6)
7 (room 105) 4 (13) 5 (8)
11 (room 89) 4 (13) 3 (5)
12 (room 89) 4 (13) 4 (6)
(Invasive) procedures during ICU stay, frequency (%)
Surgery prior to or during ICU stay 26 (81) 34 (53) 3.9 (1.4;11) 0.010
If yes, surgery in operation room (selection2)
8 5 (19) 1 (3)
17 5 (19) 1 (3)
19 8 (31) 5 (15)
Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation 1 (3) 3 (5)
Intra-aortic balloon pump 3 (9) 7 (11)
Continuous veno-venous haemoﬁltration 13 (41) 18 (28)
If yes, duration of CVVH, mean days (range) 25 (5–57) 19 (3–77)
If yes, CVVH machine (no selection)
352 6 (46) 6 (33)
353 2 (15) 8 (44)
354 4 (31) 3 (17)
356 3 (23) 7 (39)
358 (not room-speciﬁc) 6 (46) 4 (22) 3.6 (0.9;14) 0.076
364 4 (31) 3 (17)
Central venous catheters, cumulative, mean days (range) 18 (0–59) 14 (0–66) 1.1 (1.0;1.1) 0.028
If CVC present, number of line replacements, mean (range) 1.3 (0–6) 1.2 (0–6)
Gastrointestinal endoscopy 8 (25) 15 (23)
Duodenum or jejunum probe 7 (22) 13 (20)
Registered wound with special care 11 (34) 19 (30)
Vacuum-assisted closure 3 (9) 4 (6)
Warming-up with warm-air blanket 17 (53) 20 (31) 2.6 (1.0;6.3) 0.040
Cooling with cooling mattress 3 (9) 12 (19)
Ventilation parameters
Duration of invasive ventilation, mean days (range) 20 (1–58) 21 (1–77)
Optiﬂow therapy, frequency (%) 11 (34) 21 (33)
Bronchoalveolar lavage, frequency (%) 2 (6) 22 (34) 0.08 (0.01;0.59) 0.014
Bronchoscopy for other reason than BAL, frequency (%) 2 (6) 6 (9)
Tracheostomy tube, frequency (%) 11 (34) 24 (38)
If yes, duration of presence, mean days (range) 21 (3–53) 22 (1–46)
Ventilation by mobile ventilation machine 18 (56) 42 (66)
Ventilation machine (selection2), frequency (%)
ICCE11-13 (bed 3, room 114) 5 (16) 3 (5) 4.3 (0.8;23) 0.084
ICCE11-15 5 (16) 7 (11)
ICCE11-26 (bed 11, room 89) 6 (19) 0 <0.05
Antibiotic use during ICU admission, mean days (range)
Cefalosporines (2nd and 3rd generation) 5.9 (0–20) 6.1 (0–33)
Ciproﬂoxacin 2.3 (0–18) 2.4 (0–21)
Meropenem 1.6 (0–32) 1.1 (0–21)
Aminoglycosides (gentamicin and tobramycin) 1.4 (0–8) 1.5 (0–7)
Selective oropharyngeal decontamination 21 (0–78) 24 (0–79) 0.9 (0.8;1.0) 0.039
Selective digestive tract decontamniation 16 (0–78) 19 (0–79)
OR, odds ratio; 95% CI, 95% conﬁdence interval; IC(U), intensive care (unit); CVVH, continuous veno-venous haemoﬁltration; CVC, central venous catheters; BAL,
bronchoalveolar lavage.
1Matching variable.
2Selection of rooms, beds, operation rooms and ventilation machines with the largest differences between case and control patients.
3Until December 2010, ICUs 1 and 2 were on a different ﬂoor level to ICUs 3 and 4. From December 2010 onwards, ICUs 3 and 4 were moved to be situated next to
Units 1 and 2.
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December 2011. Control samples taken in February 2012
were negative.
Case-control study. Of the 46 case patients in total, 44 had been
admitted to the ICU and 32 met the inclusion criteria. Those
32 cases were matched to 64 controls.
Patient characteristics and the exposure factors analysed for
association with acquiring the outbreak strain are depicted in
Table 2. Odds ratios and p-values are given for (borderline)
statistically signiﬁcant results.
Matching for date of admission resulted in a median
difference of 6 days (range 0–491 days, mean difference
50 days). Univariate analysis pointed to a putative effect
of surgery in the acquisition of the outbreak strain.
Additionally, ICU 1 and room 89, and various machines
and procedures, were found to be potentially associated
with the acquisition of the outbreak strain (Table 2).
Undergoing bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and the longer
use of selective oropharyngeal decontamination (SOD) were
negatively associated.
In multivariate analysis, three factors were independently
associated with the MDR-PA: admission to ICU 1 (OR, 6.1;
95% CI, 1.7, 22; p = 0.006), surgery prior to or during
admission (OR, 5.7; 95% CI, 1.6, 20; p = 0.007) and being
warmed-up with the warm-air blanket (OR, 3.6; 95% CI, 1.2,
11; p = 0.023).
Infection control measures
Actions were taken to avoid spread of the MDR-PA (Fig. 2).
First, infection control practitioners audited care-related
procedures, cleaning procedures and hygiene measures on
the ICU (November 2010 and June 2011). This led to
re-education of all ICU personnel on basic hygiene protocols
(February and June 2011). Also a new protocol for tracheos-
tomy care was implemented (February 2011) and the sharing
of equipment between patients was no longer permitted as of
June 2011 (e.g. inﬂatable hair-washing basin, shaving machine
and blood pressure bands).
Standard contact isolation, comprising a single room and the
use of gloves when touching a case patient or his direct
environment, was implemented until June 2011. As new cases
continued to occur, these measures were extended from June
2011 onwards to wearing disposable gowns. As of September
2011, this extended contact isolation protocol was used for all
patients on the two ICUs with the highest incidence (ICUs 1
and 2), irrespective of MDR-PA carriership. As the number of
single rooms was limited, these were conﬁned to proven
cases. These measures decreased the number of new cases,
even prior to removal of the common source, and remained in
place until May 2012.
Cases were labelled in the electronic information system of
the hospital as of May 2011, to denote the risk of transmission.
To prevent future spread via (secondarily) contaminated
faucets, a new maintenance protocol was implemented in
January 2012 requiring replacement of faucet aerators four
times a year on all IC units.
Discussion
A prolonged outbreak of a multidrug-resistant P. aeruginosa is
described that demonstrates that the integration of epidemi-
ological data, microbiological data and the strict application of
infection control measures is crucial to bringing such an
outbreak to a halt. In Fig. 4 this is illustrated for the present
outbreak.
FIG. 3. Example of AFLP results. Showing the homology within and between Clusters 1 and 2. Related and unrelated controls were tested in the
same run to control for homology within related strains.
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In May 2012 the enhanced hygiene and isolation measures
were discontinued because no new cases had occurred for
3 months. Unfortunately, 7 months after the last case had
occurred, four patients on the ICU emerged with the Cluster
2 strain (August to October 2012). This small new cluster was
readily controlled by intensiﬁcation of hygiene and isolation
measures and by screening of roommates. Single cases have
occurred since, in January, March and April 2013; all three
isolates were typed as Cluster 2. No common source has been
found yet. Further research focuses on sink drains.
Genetic clusters
The outbreak was mainly accounted for by the Cluster 2 strain
(Fig. 2), for which a common source was found. However, the
more constant, low rate occurrence of the Cluster 1 strain
remained unexplained. Thus, the outbreak was due to two
distinct clones of MDR-PA.
By sharing our information with other hospitals in the
Netherlands, we learned that this MDR-PA outbreak was not
limited to the LUMC. In another tertiary care centre, the Cluster
1 strain was mainly found to be responsible [5]. (Re)introduction
of this strain from other hospitals into our centre might explain
the presence of the Cluster 1 strain on our ICU. In the light of a
nationwide surveillance study a number of our isolates from both
Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 were typed by multilocus sequence
typing (MLST). All were identiﬁed as ST111, a widespread
international sequence type associated with multidrug resistance
and the carriage of the VIM-2 MBL gene [14].
Source and transmission
Two contaminated faucet aerators were identiﬁed, from which
faucet-to-patient and subsequently patient-to-patient transmis-
sion could occur. Contaminated tap water and faucets have
previously been found to contribute to the nosocomial spread
Infection control measures
• Basic hand hygiene
• Isolation measures
- Contact isolation
- Extended contact isolation
- All in ext. contact isolation
• Active patient screening
• Case labeling
Descriptive epidemiology
• Date and transmission map
First observation
Ti
m
e
• Interpatient transmission
• Suspect rooms
Case-control study
Environmental screening
• Round 1: sinks
• Round 2: 125 environm.
cultures
• Round 3: sinks
• Round 4: directed by 
case-control + faucets
• Disposable washing basins
• Renewal of faucets
STOP
Interpatient 
transmission
• Sinks (round 1+2+3)
• Inflatable hair washing basin (round 2)
• Faucets (round 4)
STOP
Common 
source
• ICU1
• Surgery
• Warm-air blanket
FIG. 4. Description of integrated approach used for this outbreak. After the ﬁrst observation, infection control measures were re-enforced or
newly implemented. Descriptive epidemiology identiﬁed rooms with a high number of cases and suggested interpatient transmission. This supported
the importance of the fortiﬁed infection control measures. After three screening rounds that did not lead to a clear common source, a fourth
screening round was directed by the ﬁndings of the case-control study and included culturing of faucets. Two faucets were found to be positive and
were replaced, by which the common source was removed and the outbreak was brought to a halt.
ª2013 The Authors
Clinical Microbiology and Infection ª2013 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 20, O207–O215
CMI Knoester et al. Management of prolonged outbreak on intensive care unit O213
of P. aeruginosa [6,15–20]. As described by Reuter et al. [18],
occasional retrograde contamination from patient to faucet
may initiate as well as maintain this problem. Retrospectively,
we concluded that screening of faucets should have been done
earlier in the outbreak investigation.
The inﬂatable hair-washing basin was another potential
source, with a positive culture and being shared between
patients. However, new cases occurred after restriction of
use.
Hota et al. [21] showed that sinks can be a source of
transmission, by splashing drain contents at least one metre
from the sink. In the present outbreak, the role of sinks was
unclear. They may have accounted for the spread of the
Cluster 1 strain (present in sinks but not in faucets).
However, a high number of positive sinks (31%) on ICUs 3
and 4 with the very low number of cases contrasts with this
hypothesis.
Improvement of hygiene and isolation measures led to a
noticeable decrease in new cases even before removal of
contaminated faucet aerators. This implied an important role
for cross-transmission via healthcare workers. A similar
conclusion was drawn in previous reports, often supported
by positive specimens from the hands of healthcare workers
[4,19,22–26].
Case-control study
Admission to ICU 1 increased the risk 6-fold, which may be
explained by the common source in room 89 and subsequent
transmission. The date and transmission map showed that the
high number of cases from bed 5/ICU 2 occurred after the ﬁnal
inclusion-date of the case-control study. This explains why this
bed and subunit were not found to be risk factors.
The association with surgery is less easily explained, in line
with Kohlenberg et al. [1]. Although surgery patients may have
been admitted more often to ICUs 1 and 2, surgery and unit
were independently associated with cases. A common source
in the operation rooms was considered, but not found.
Surgical patients may have decreased skin barrier function, but
the most frequent site of primary isolation was not wounds
but the respiratory tract. This raised suspicion regarding
mechanical ventilation and pulmonary invasive procedures
[27–30], which could not be conﬁrmed by evaluating ventila-
tion parameters (Table 2). The negative association with BAL
was likely to be due to confounding, as BAL and surgery were
oppositely related.
Warming-up is indicated for patients after surgery and in
other cases of hypothermia. Interestingly, warming-up was a
risk factor independent of surgery. Cultures of warm-air
machines were negative. Hence this association could not be
clariﬁed.
The longer use of SOD was a protective factor in univariate
analysis, but was only borderline signiﬁcant in multivariate
regression analysis (OR, 0.9; 95% CI, 0.8, 1.0; p = 0.069). SOD
could protect patients against the MDR-PA by containing
colistin. The same effect would then be expected for Selective
Digestive tract Decontamination (SDD), which was not found.
An alternative explanation would be that the use of SOD
interfered with culturing, and delayed or disguised positivity.
A limitation of this case-control study was the relatively
impaired matching on date of admission. As the outbreak
spread over a period of 3 years, this may have been of minor
inﬂuence. Secondly, the presence of drains was not evaluated,
and this may have been the missing link between surgery and
the increased risk of colonization and infection [1].
The MDR-PA was present on the ICU for 3 years. Major
factors in the management of this outbreak were enforcement
of extended hygiene and isolation measures, identiﬁcation and
eradication of a common source and identiﬁcation of risk
factors. Integration of these various components ﬁnally led to
control of the outbreak, although eradication of the outbreak
strain has not yet been achieved.
Acknowledgements
J.P. Vandenbroucke, clinical epidemiologist, and E.W. van
Zwet, statistician, advised on design and analysis of the
case-control study. S.J. Zuurveen, infection control practi-
tioner, A.H. Brunsveld-Reinders and R.B.P. de Wilde, both
research nurses, assisted with data collection. The case-con-
trol study was presented at the Scientiﬁc Spring Meeting of the
Dutch Society for Medical Microbiology in Arnhem, the
Netherlands, on 18 April 2012.
Transparency Declaration
The authors declare no conﬂicts of interest.
References
1. Kohlenberg A, Weitzel-Kage D, van der Linden P et al. Outbreak of
carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection in a surgical
intensive care unit. J Hosp Infect 2010; 74: 350–357.
2. Naze F, Jouen E, Randriamahazo RT et al. Pseudomonas aeruginosa
outbreak linked to mineral water bottles in a neonatal intensive care
unit: fast typing by use of high-resolution melting analysis of a
variable-number tandem-repeat locus. J Clin Microbiol 2010; 48: 3146–
3152.
3. Jefferies JM, Cooper T, Yam T, Clarke SC. Pseudomonas aeruginosa
outbreaks in the neonatal intensive care unit - a systematic review of
ª2013 The Authors
Clinical Microbiology and Infection ª2013 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 20, O207–O215
O214 Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 20 Number 4, April 2014 CMI
risk factors and environmental sources. J Med Microbiol 2012; 61: 1052–
1061.
4. Lanini S, D’Arezzo S, Puro V et al. Molecular epidemiology of a
Pseudomonas aeruginosa hospital outbreak driven by a contaminated
disinfectant-soap dispenser. PLoS ONE 2011; 6: e17064.
5. Van der Bij AK, Van MR, Peirano G et al. First outbreak of VIM-2
metallo-beta-lactamase-producing Pseudomonas aeruginosa in The
Netherlands: microbiology, epidemiology and clinical outcomes. Int J
Antimicrob Agents 2011; 37: 513–518.
6. Breathnach AS, Cubbon MD, Karunaharan RN, Pope CF, Planche TD.
Multidrug-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa outbreaks in two hospi-
tals: association with contaminated hospital waste-water systems.
J Hosp Infect 2012; 82: 19–24.
7. Eckmanns T, Oppert M, Martin M et al. An outbreak of hospi-
tal-acquired Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection caused by contami-
nated bottled water in intensive care units. Clin Microbiol Infect 2008; 14:
454–458.
8. Bert F, Maubec E, Bruneau B, Berry P, Lambert-Zechovsky N.
Multi-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa outbreak associated with
contaminated tap water in a neurosurgery intensive care unit. J Hosp
Infect 1998; 39: 53–62.
9. Ferroni A, Nguyen L, Pron B, Quesne G, Brusset MC, Berche P.
Outbreak of nosocomial urinary tract infections due to Pseudomonas
aeruginosa in a paediatric surgical unit associated with tap-water
contamination. J Hosp Infect 1998; 39: 301–307.
10. Iversen BG. Contaminated mouth swabs caused a multi-hospital
outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection. J Oral Microbiol 2010; 2:
doi:10.3402/jom.v2i0.5123.
11. Reingold AL. Outbreak investigations–a perspective. Emerg Infect Dis
1998; 4: 21–27.
12. de Smet AM, Kluytmans JA, Cooper BS et al. Decontamination of the
digestive tract and oropharynx in ICU patients. N Engl J Med 2009; 360:
20–31.
13. Vos P, Hogers R, Bleeker M et al. AFLP: a new technique for DNA
ﬁngerprinting. Nucleic Acids Res 1995; 23: 4407–4414.
14. Van der Bij AK, Van der Zwan D, Peirano G et al. Metallo-beta-lac-
tamase-producing Pseudomonas aeruginosa in the Netherlands: the
nationwide emergence of a single sequence type. Clin Microbiol Infect
2012; 18: E369–E372.
15. Blanc DS, Nahimana I, Petignat C, Wenger A, Bille J, Francioli P.
Faucets as a reservoir of endemic Pseudomonas aeruginosa coloniza-
tion/infections in intensive care units. Intensive Care Med 2004; 30:
1964–1968.
16. Cuttelod M, Senn L, Terletskiy V et al. Molecular epidemiology of
Pseudomonas aeruginosa in intensive care units over a 10-year period
(1998-2007). Clin Microbiol Infect 2011; 17: 57–62.
17. Muscarella LF. Contribution of tap water and environmental surfaces
to nosocomial transmission of antibiotic-resistant Pseudomonas aeru-
ginosa. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2004; 25: 342–345.
18. Reuter S, Sigge A, Wiedeck H, Trautmann M. Analysis of transmission
pathways of Pseudomonas aeruginosa between patients and tap water
outlets. Crit Care Med 2002; 30: 2222–2228.
19. Rogues AM, Boulestreau H, Lasheras A et al. Contribution of tap water
to patient colonisation with Pseudomonas aeruginosa in a medical
intensive care unit. J Hosp Infect 2007; 67: 72–78.
20. Trautmann M, Michalsky T, Wiedeck H, Radosavljevic V, Ruhnke M.
Tap water colonization with Pseudomonas aeruginosa in a
surgical intensive care unit (ICU) and relation to Pseudomonas
infections of ICU patients. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2001; 22:
49–52.
21. Hota S, Hirji Z, Stockton K et al. Outbreak of multidrug-resistant
Pseudomonas aeruginosa colonization and infection secondary to
imperfect intensive care unit room design. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol
2009; 30: 25–33.
22. Bergmans DC, Bonten MJ, van Tiel FH et al. Cross-colonisation with
Pseudomonas aeruginosa of patients in an intensive care unit. Thorax
1998; 53: 1053–1058.
23. Bertrand X, Bailly P, Blasco G, Balvay P, Boillot A, Talon D. Large
outbreak in a surgical intensive care unit of colonization or infection
with Pseudomonas aeruginosa that overexpressed an active efﬂux
pump. Clin Infect Dis 2000; 31: E9–E14.
24. Doring G, Ulrich M, Muller W et al. Generation of Pseudomonas
aeruginosa aerosols during handwashing from contaminated sink
drains, transmission to hands of hospital personnel, and its prevention
by use of a new heating device. Zentralbl Hyg Umweltmed 1991; 191:
494–505.
25. Foca M, Jakob K, Whittier S et al. Endemic Pseudomonas aeruginosa
infection in a neonatal intensive care unit. N Engl J Med 2000; 343: 695–
700.
26. Moolenaar RL, Crutcher JM, San Joaquin VH et al. A prolonged
outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa in a neonatal intensive care unit:
did staff ﬁngernails play a role in disease transmission? Infect Control
Hosp Epidemiol 2000; 21: 80–85.
27. DiazGranados CA, Jones MY, Kongphet-Tran T et al. Outbreak of
Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection associated with contamination of a
ﬂexible bronchoscope. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2009; 30: 550–555.
28. Kikuchi T, Nagashima G, Taguchi K et al. Contaminated oral
intubation equipment associated with an outbreak of carbape-
nem-resistant Pseudomonas in an intensive care unit. J Hosp Infect
2007; 65: 54–57.
29. Kirschke DL, Jones TF, Craig AS et al. Pseudomonas aeruginosa and
Serratia marcescens contamination associated with a manufacturing
defect in bronchoscopes. N Engl J Med 2003; 348: 214–220.
30. Cortes JA, Cuervo SI, Urdaneta AM et al. Identifying and controlling a
multiresistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa outbreak in a Latin-American
cancer centre and its associated risk factors. Braz J Infect Dis 2009; 13:
99–103.
ª2013 The Authors
Clinical Microbiology and Infection ª2013 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 20, O207–O215
CMI Knoester et al. Management of prolonged outbreak on intensive care unit O215
